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LIABILITY OF DEPOSITORY FOR

TRUSTEE'S M1SAPPROPRIATION OF TRUST FUNDS -

UNIFORM FIDUCIARY

AcT - Defendant bank was the depository of trust funds specially earmarked
for payment of an outstanding issue of trust notes. The trustee's individual
account in defendant was overdrawn; and the trustee was also indebted to
defendant on a promissory note. The trustee drew a fiduciary check in favor
of himself for the entire amount of the trust account, indorsed it, and deposited it
in his individual account. This wiped out the overdraft and left a credit balance.
Then the trustee paid his note to defendant with a check drawn on his individual account in favor of defendant. Held, under the Uniform Fiduciaries Act 1
defendant is not liable for the misappropriation of trust funds in payment of the
note; but the act does not apply to the overdraft payment, and defendant is
liable therefor at common law. Colby v. Riggs Nat. Bank, (App. D. C. 1937)
92 F. (2d) 183.
Although there has been much divergence of opinion as to its application,
courts have long agreed on "the general principle that one who knowingly assists a fiduciary in a breach of duty thereby incurs liability to the principal for the
loss sustained." 2 A great deal of the variance in results has arisen through
application of the common-law doctrine of implied, imputed, or constructive
knowledge of the fiduciary's breach of duty. 8 For instance, courts differ as to
whether or not a bank which permits funds, known to it to be impressed with
a trust, to be deposited in the trustee's individual account is charged with constructive knowledge of future misappropriation of such funds by the trustee.
The majority hold that these funds in the trustee's individual account become
impressed with the trust, and that the depository has no constructive knowledge
of' the misappropriation, and hence is not liable.4 But when the depository pays
a check drawn on these funds in payment of a debt known to it to be a private
debt of the trustee, as, for instance, a debt owing directly to the depository, the

1 The act has been adopted in the following states: Colorado, District of Columbia,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Somewhat similar
statutes have been enacted in Kentucky, Rhode Island and Virginia. 9 UNIFORM LAws
ANN. 146 (1932) and Pocket Supp.; 16 VA. L. REv. 401 (1930). For a general discussion of the policy question, of which the act represents one side, see Merrill, "Bankers'
Liability for Deposits of a Fiduciary to His Personal Account," 40 HARV. L. REv.
10-77 (1927); Commissioners' Notes on the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, 9 U. L. A.
147 (1932).
2 Merrill, "Bankers' Liability for Deposits of a Fiduciary to His Personal Account,"
40 HARV. L. REV. 1066 at 1087 (1927); 4 BoGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, c. 43
(1935).
8 lbid.
4 2 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § 324 (1935); 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, §
908 (1935). The act is a codification of the majority view on this question. Uniform
Fiduciaries Act, § 9 (see note 7, infra); 9 U. L.A. 153 (1932).
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transaction falls under the general rule above, and liability attaches. 5 The instant case is of this type, so at common law the depository would have been held
liable. The Uniform Fiduciaries Act,6 however, abrogates the common-law
rule of constructive knowledge in this case,7 and sets as the basis for liability
actual knowledge 8 or bad faith. 9 At first glance one might question whether
section 9 of the act, which authorizes a bank "to pay" such checks without
incurring libality,10 covers the instant case, since here the bank is really receiving a check; but a comparison of the wording of sections 7 and 8 with section
9,11 together with a study of the purposes and intentions of the drafters 12 and
5 57 A. L. R. 925 (1928); 64 A. L. R. 1404 (1929); 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES, § 910 (1935). The depository has imputed knowledge that the account
drawn on is impressed with a trust, and actual knowledge that the funds are being
used for the trustee's private purposes. In general on the common law, see Scott,
"Participation in a Breach of Trust," 34 HARV. L. REv. 454 (1921); McCollum,
"Liability of Banks Receiving Checks to a Trustee's Order for Deposit in his Individual Account," II Cot. L. REv. 428 (19u); Thulin, "Misappropriation of Funds
by Fiduciaries: The Bank's Liability,'' 6 CAL. L. REv. 171 (1918); 24 CoL. L. REV.
661 (1924); 16 VA. L. REV. 401 (1930); 36 MICH. L. REV. 677 (1938).
6
"The general purpose of the Act is to establish uniform and definite rules in
place of the diverse and indefinite rules now prevailing as to constructive notice of
breaches of fiduciary obligations." Commissioners' Notes on Uniform Fiduciaries Act, 9
U.L.A. 147 (1932); H. Rep. No. 875, 70th Cong., 1st sess. (1928); S. Rep. No.
763, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928).
1 "If a fiduciary makes a deposit in a bank to his personal credit of checks drawn
by him upon account in his own name as fiduciary • • • or if he otherwise makes a
deposit of funds held by him as fiduciary, the bank receiving such deposit is not bound
to inquire whether the fiduciary is committing thereby a breach of his obligation as
fiduciary; and the bank is authorized to pay the amount of the deposit or any part
thereof upon the personal check of the fiduciary without being liable to the principal,
unless the bank receives the deposit or pays the check with actual knowledge that the
fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation as fiduciary in making such deposit
or in drawing such check, or with knowledge of such facts that its action in receiving
the deposit or paying the check amounts to bad faith." Uniform Fiduciaries Act, §
9; 9 U. L. A. 153 (1932).
8
"In Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Girard Trust Co., 307 Pa. 488, 161 A. 865
at 867, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania construed the expression 'actual knowledge
of breach of his obligation as fiduciary' to be the equivalent of misappropriation. Thus,
wherever the words appear in the act they are to be read to mean actual knowledge of
misappropriation ••••" The principal case, 92 F. (2d) at 194.
9
The act does not define "bad faith"; but by§ 1 (2), "A thing is done 'in good
faith' within the meaning of this act, when it is in fact done honestly, whether it be
done negligently or not." Uniform Fiduciaries Act, § l; 9 U. L.A. 147 (1932).
10 See note 7, supra.
11 In sections 7 and 8 the bank is authorized to pay the check unless "such a check
it payable to the drawee bank." In section 9 there is no qualifying exception. The
addition of the exception in sections 7 and 8 and its omission in section 9 indicate
an intent on the part of the drafters not to limit section 9 in this respect. 9 U. L. A.
154 (1932).
12 "The purpose of sections 7, 8 and 9 is to lay down a definite rule, making the
bank ••• where [it] acts as creditor ••• liable to the same extent as other creditors
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legislators 18 whose efforts made the act law, convinces one that the court correctly held that the act was intended to apply to such a case, and, if interpreted
fairly, does apply in terms. In view of the lower court's finding that all of
defendant's officers and employees acted in good faith throughout the entire
series of transactions, and had no knowledge that the trustee did or intended to
misappropriate trust funds, u it is submitted that the decision is correct as regards the check in payment of the trustee's note to the bank.15 The majority
of the court were of the opinion that section 6 of the act 16 does not protect
defendant in the matter of the overdraft, however. One reason given was that
· the fiduciary account was in the ,name of two different fiduciaries jointly, and
they drew a joint check in favor of only one of them; 17 hence the transaction
does not fall within the literal language of section 6, "a check ••• drawn by a
fiduciary ••• payable to the fiduciary personally." This argument applies with
equal force to take the payment of the note out from under the protection of
section 9, the language there being similar,18 yet that was not considered worthy
of mention by the court. Of more cogency is the majority contention that the
act was intended to protect the transferees of fiduciary negotiable instruments
in the immediate transactions only, and that it should not be extended to cover
the bookkeeping transaction by which the overdraft was checked off.19 But
are made liable." Commissioner's Notes on Uniform Fiduciaries Act, 9 U. L.A. 155
(1932). See note 16, infra, for the text of section 6, which clearly declares no liability
if the bank were merely an ordinary creditor.
18 H. Rep. No. 875, 70th Cong., Ist sess. (1928); S. Rep. No. 763, 70th Cong.,
1st sess. ( I 928).
14 "It must be remembered also that frequently all the clues are not known to any
one employee of the bank, and that the facts known to any one employee are not
sufficient to arouse suspicion. • •• If no one of the employees has knowledge of any
breach of trust the bank should not be held liable merely because it appears that at
some stage by piecing together all the facts known to different employees a breach of
trust would become more or less apparent." Scott, "Participation in a Breach of Trust,"
34 HARv. L. REV. 454 at 480-481 (1921).
15 Accord: New Amsterdam Gas Co. v. National, etc., Banking Co., II 7 N. J.
Eq. 264, 175 A. 609 (1934), affd. u9 N. J. Eq. 540, 182 A. 824 (1936).
16 "If a check . . . is drawn by a fiduciary as such • . • payable to the fiduciary
personally ••• and is thereafter transferred by the fiduciary, whether in payment of
a personal debt of the fiduciary or otherwise, the transferee is not bound to inquire
whether the fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation as fiduciary in transferring the instrument, and is not chargeable with notice that the fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation as fiduciary unless he takes the instrument with actual
knowledge of such breach or with knowledge of such facts that his action in taking
the instrument amounts to bad faith." Uniform Fiduciaries Act, § 6; 9 U. L.A. 151
(1932).
17 The trust deposit was to the joint credit of Swartzell, Rheem & Hensey Co.,
which was named by the original trust deed as agent of the noteholders to receive
payment, and Luther A. Swartzell and Edmund D. Rheem, who were named by the
deed as trustees. The individual account to which the fund was transferred was in
the name of Swartzell, Rheem & Hensey Co.
18 See note 7, supra.
19 92 F. (2d) at 198.
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concededly the overdraft was a debt of the trustee,20 and from common experience we know that even though a depositor's specific purpose be to pay an overdraft he does so by merely depositing in his account a sufficient sum of money.
It is not necessary, nor even usual, that he go to the bank's officers and tender the
amount with an explanation of his purpose. Nor is it necessary that the bookkeeper of the bank make his. credit entry in order to wipe out the debt; it is
the payment and not the recording of it which is in law a discharge of the
debtor. Further, the language of section 6 is broad-"in payment of a personal
debt • • • or otherwise"; 21 as is also the language regarding the purpose of the
act. 22 The majority probably felt that "this is a statute in derogation of the common law, and its operation ought not to be enlarged beyond the fair natural
meaning of the language." 23 Nevertheless, it is submitted that the overdraft
transaction is within both the spirit and letter of the act, and the depository should
be held not liable for the overdraft payment as well as for the note. 24

SeePittsburgh v. First Nat. Bank, 230 Pa. 176 at 183, 79 A. 406 (1911).
See note 1 6, supra.
22 See note 6, supra.
28 Denio, C. J., in Van Beuren v. Dash, 30 N. Y. 393 at 423 (1864).
24 For cases illustrating the application of the act to other situations, see annotations in 9 U.L.A. 147 (1932), and Pocket Supp.; 81 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 863 (1933).
Cf. Pennsylvania Co. for Insurance on Lives v. Ninth Bank & Trust Co., 306 Pa. 148,
158 A. 251 (1932), involving a similar overdraft payment. Section 5 of the act was
held to make the bank liable; for some unexplained reason, section 6 was neither distinguished nor applied. See also, 38 CoL. L. REV. 495 ( 1938) for a note on the
principal case.
20

21

